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courts will continue in their refusal to find state action in the conduct of
the internal operations of private educational institutions, in spite of the
predictions and admonitions of the commentators. Needed is a clear-cut
policy decision by the Supreme Court to bring the private university
within the scope of state action for due process purposes. No such deci-
sion appears to be forthcoming; until then, the lower courts will continue
their application, or misapplication, of the Burton test.
SCOTT MACNEELY TURNER
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS IN PRIVATE SUITS
UNDER SECTION 303 OF THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT
When Congress passed the Labor Management Relations Act,' a
primary goal was to control union practices considered injurious to em-
ployers and the public. 2 In achieving this objective, section 8(b)(4) of the
Act3 forbids specific concerted union activities such as the secondary
boycott.' Section 3031 permits anyone injured in his business or property
by reason of a violation of 8(b)(4) to sue the union to recover damages
'Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et
seq. (1970).
2S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947).
329 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970). Section 8(b)(4), relating to unfair labor practices, was
one of numerous amendments to the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 29
U.S.C. § 141 elseq. (1970).
'The thrust of section 8(b)(4) was expressed in terms of prohibiting union conduct
intended to induce strikes or concerted work stoppages by employees in the course of their
employment where an object is to force any employer or person to cease doing business with
another employer or person. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970). See also C. MORRIS, THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 604-74 (1971).
5Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 187
(1970), provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this section only, in an indus-
try or activity affecting commerce, for any labor organization to engage
in any activity or conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in section
158(b)(4) of this title.
(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any
violation [of] subsection (a) of this section may sue therefore in any district
court of the United States subject to the limitations and provisions of
section 185 of this title without respect to the amount in controversy, or
in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover the
damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit.
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sustained by him and the cost of the suit. However, in creating this federal
cause of action in favor of those injured by unfair labor practices, Con-
gress failed to provide either a limitation on the time for bringing suit or
a reference as to when such a cause of action accrues! The problems
created by this omission are well illustrated in a recent Fourth Circuit
decision.
In Railing v. United Mine Workers of America,7 plaintiffs, doing
business as the C & P Coal Company, conducted a non-union strip-
mining operation and coal tipple in West Virginia. Beginning in April of
1958, the company's employees, allegedly instigated by the United Mine
Workers (UMW), struck and picketed these operatons. Plaintiffs main-
tained the UMW's purpose was violative of section 8(b)(4) relating to
unfair labor practices.8 In addition, plaintiffs asserted that UMW de-
stroyed specific items of equipment and property.' All strike activity
ended on July 14, 1959 pursuant to an injunction issued by the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB); however, plaintiffs did not institute this
action for damages under section 303 until June 28, 1961, nearly one year
and eleven and one-half months after cessation of the strike.
The Railings claimed that the continuous illegal conduct on the part
of UMW constituted a single cause of action which accrued on July 14,
1959 when the unlawful activities ceased. UMW cofitended, first, that a
separate cause of action accrued for each day's damage as it occurred
and, second, that a West Virginia one-year statute of limitations was
applicable. On UMW's motion for summary judgment, the district
court" found that since section 303 of the Labor Management Relations
Act contained no statute of limitations, it must refer to state law to
determine the period of limitation to be applied." As a result, the court
'Suits under section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act are distinct from
complaints of unfair labor practices by the National Labor Relations Board. Although
Congress provided no national statute of limitations for section 303 suits, it did impose a
six month statute of limitations on complaints before the National Labor Relations Board.
National Labor Relations Act § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970). See Notes 81-95 and
accompanying text infra.
7445 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1971).
8Plaintiffs alleged that defendant induced and encouraged the employees of the C & P
Coal Company to engage in a refusal to produce coal at plaintiff's strip pit for the purpose
of forcing the plaintiffs to cease doing business with other employers and to force other
employers to recognize the union as the bargaining representative of their employees. Railing
v. UMW, 276 F. Supp. 238, 247-48 (N.D. W. Va. 1967).
'Plaintiffs requested compensatory and punitive damages for these common law torts
pursuant to the court's pendent jurisdiction. 276 F. Supp. at 240.
10276 F. Supp. at 243-45.
"Id. at 241. See text at notes 41-51 infra relating the absence of a controlling federal
statute of limitations to actions at law in which a federally created right is being enforced.
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adopted the West Virginia two-year statute of limitations and held that
this period began to run on defendant's alleged illegal activities each day
damage occurred, and not from the time when all such activities ceased.,'
The effect of this ruling was to deny recovery for all damages except for
those which occurred after June 28, 1959.11
The court of appeals reversed," reasoning that since the total damage
would not have been ascertainable before the illegal strike ceased, the
application of a day to day accrual principle was inapposite.'6 Moreover,
the court noted that inclusion of all damages resulting from day to day
acts would require frequent amendments to the complaint to include
newly accrued damages, or speculation as to total damages that would
eventually result from the strike.7 Thus, focusing upon the continuing
nature of the injury, the court held that the cause of action accrued on
the last date of continuing illegal conduct for purposes of applying the
statute of limitations.'" Under the theory enunciated in this decision,
plaintiff's entire suit was timely.
The Supreme Court, however, in a per curiam opinion,"9 vacated
judgment and remanded to the court of appeals for further consideration
in light of Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,2 a recent
Supreme Court decision construing the accrual of a cause of action for
'2W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-2-12(a) (1971). The Railings originally instituted this action
in the District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, but it was transferred to the
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia upon motion of UMW. Conse-
quently, the court held that it must look to the law of the State of Kentucky, the state from
which the transfer was made, including Kentucky's "borrowing statute," Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 413.320 (1971), to determine the statute of limitations applicable to the cause of
action sued upon. The Kentucky statute required the application of the West Virginia two-
year period of limitation, since it was shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by
Kentucky. This ruling was not challenged by plaintiffs in subsequent proceedings. 276 F.
Supp. at 241-42.
See further discussion of the statute of limitations at notes 41-45 and accompanying
text infra.
13276 F. Supp. at 243.
"Since under rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure an action is deemed
commenced upon the filing of the complaint with the court, June 28, 1961 in the principal
case, the earliest date of applicability of the statute of limitations would be June 28, 1959.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
15429 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1970).
"11d. at 783.
171d.
"'he court reasoned that the victim should be entitled to sue as soon as he could do
so, but should not be required to sue until illegal activity had ceased. Thus, suit for separate
injuries for which damages could be ascertained may have been brought at an earlier time.
Id.
"9401 U.S. 486 (1971).
-401 U.S. 321 (1971).
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damage to business and property under the Clayton Act.2 In Zenith the
Court held that in the context of a continuing conspiracy to violate the
antitrust laws, each time a plaintiff suffers injury by an act of the defen-
dant, a cause of action accrues to recover the damages caused by that act
and that, as to those damages, the statute of limitations runs from the
commission of the act.12 In light of Zenith, the Supreme Court urged the
Fourth Circuit to explore whether private suits under the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act" are distinguishable from those under the Clayton
Act24 for purposes of determining the time at which a cause of action
accrues.2
On remand, the court of appeals found, as the Supreme Court seemed
to suggest, that suits under the Labor Management Relations Act and
the Clayton Act are not distinguishable with regard to the accrual of a
cause of action for injury to business or property. 2 Consequently, apply-
ing the Zenith rationale, the court held that a cause of action accrues,
for the purpose of determining when a suit may be brought and when the
statute of limitation runs, at the time that ascertainable damage occurs.2Y
Several similarities between private remedies under the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act and those in the Clayton Act support the analogy
suggested by the Supreme Court and subsequently adopted by the court
of appeals. Section 303(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act pro-
vides that it shall be unlawful for any labor organization to engage in
''any activity or conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in section
[8(b)(4)] of the National Labor Relations Act." z The language of section
303(b) creates a right of action in "[w]hoever shall be injured in his
business or property"29 by the unlawful activity and provides that the
injured party may "recover damages by him sustained." 0 Section 4 of
the Clayton Act permits "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business
or property"'3 by reason of a violation of the antitrust laws to bring suit
to "recovery threefold the damages by him sustained .... ,,32 In both
cases, suit may be brought in the federal courts without regard to the
2115 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
2401 U.S. at 338. For consideration of the Zenith holding as to future damages, see
text accompanying notes 63-64 infra.
23Labor Management Relations Act § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970).
2'Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
25401 U.S. at 486.
2'Railing v. UMW, 445 F.2d 353,354 (4th Cir. 1971).
271d.
21Labor Management Relations Act§ 303(a), 29 U.S.C. § 187(a) (1970).
2'Labor Management Relations Act § 303(b), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1970).
3Id.




Indeed, the legislative history of the Labor Management Relations
Act indicates that those who drafted section 303 intended that the private
action for damages under that section should be similar to the private
action for damages under the antitrust laws. In this regard, Senator Taft
in response to a question on the Senate floor stated:
The Senator [Morse] asks for a parallel and I shall give him one.
Under the Sherman Act 34 the same question of boycott damage
is subject to a suit for damages and attorney's fees. In this case,
we simply provide for the amount of the actual damages. But the
parallel is exactly the same, only under the Sherman Act, if a
group of businessmen put a small concern out of business, they are
subject to a suit for damages [through operation of section 4 of
the Clayton Act]. If a labor union does the same thing, why should
it not be subject to a suit for damages."
The most apparent difference between suits under the two acts is that
damages under section 303 are strictly compensatory" while those under
section 4 of the Clayton Act are three times the loss sustained by -the
injured party.37 Nevertheless, the policy of permitting private suits under
both statutes is identical, i.e., that damage actions should serve not only
to compensate the innocent party, but also to deter proscribed behav-
ior.3 Thus, because of the similarities in the nature of the injury involved
3Id.; Labor Management Relations Act § 303(b), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1970).
1I5 U.S.C. § I et seq. (1970). It should be noted, however, that labor organizations
are exempted from the application of antitrust laws. Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17
(1970).
193 CONG. REc. 5074 (1947) (remarks of (Senator Taft), cited in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947 at 1398 (1948).
3Labor Management Relations Act § 303(b), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1970). See also
Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260 (1970) (recovery under section 303 limited
to actual compensatory damages).
"Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
"Senator Taft remarked:
Under the bill there is a kind of injunctive remedy through the National
Labor Relations Board, but there is no possibility of a suit for dam-
ages. . . . I think the threat of a suit for damages is a tremendous deter-
rent to the institution of secondary boycotts and jurisdictional strikes.
93 CONG. REC. 5060 (1947), cited in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MAN-
AGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 at 1371 (1948).
The Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws has com-
mented on the federal purpose of private suits under the antitrust laws:
Private suits aid antitrust enforcement. The private suit blends antitrust
policy with private compensatory law; on the one hand. . . such suits aim
to enlist the 'business public . . . as allies of the Government in enforcing
the antitrust laws;' the means chosen, on the other hand, is to give the
1972]
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and in the policies underlying the right to recover for such injuries, it
seems the Fourth Circuit was justified in finding that a cause of action
for injury to business or property is basically the same whether derived
from a statute governing labor-management relations or free enterprise
between competing business entities."
If, in fact, the Labor Management Relations Act and the Clayton Act
offer essentially parallel remedies for injury to business and property, the
question becomes whether case law under the Clayton Act may be utilized
to fill gaps left by Congress in the drafting of the Labor Management
Relations Act. Such an analysis, as the Supreme Court seemed to inti-
mate,4" might prove helpful in providing answers to problems which fed-
eral courts, on the whole, have not always handled adequately. The issues
which confronted the court in Railing are fairly representative of prob-
lems, created by statutory omission, which arise in section 303 suits.
These appear to be, first, what statute of limitations should apply; second,
when does the cause of action accrue, i.e., when might suit be brought
and what starts the running of the limitation period; and third, should the
statute of limitations be suspended during the pendency of a parallel
government hearing related to defendant's alleged unfair labor practices.
The initial problem in Railing was to determine the applicable statute
of limitations. Since Congress failed to limit the time within which an
action for damages might be brought, the district court, deferring to
precedent, resorted to the law of the state where the action was insti-
tuted." This determination precipitated problems typical in this area of
inquiry since Kentucky, the jurisdiction where suit was originally
brought, had several conflicting limitation statutes, any one of which
might have applied. However, the scope of these limitation provisions
'injured party ample recompense for the wrongs suffered' by allowing
three-fold recovery of damages.
TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS § 3.01 (1965) citing Report
of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, March 31, 1956
at 378.
19445 F.2d 354 (4th Cir. 1971).
4401 U.S. at 486.
11276 F. Supp. at 241. The district court noted that the practice of resorting to state
statutes of limitation had been followed in the majority of the decisions concerned with an
interpretation of section 303. See, e.g., UMW v. Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F.2d 52 (6th
Cir. 1959); International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 350 F.2d
936 (9th Cir. 1965).
42Kentucky statutes of limitations provide a ten-year period for actions upon which no
other limitation is prescribed and a five-year period for actions involving injury to real or
personal property or to enforce liability created by statute not fixing a different limitation
period. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 413.160, 413.120(2) (1971).
[Vol. XXIX
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was subsequently narrowed by Kentucky's "borrowing statute",3 which
shifted the focus to the law of West Virginia, where the cause of action
arose. After continued deliberation, the court settled ultimately upon a
West Virginia two-year limitation period."
The convoluted inquiry pursued in Railing at the district court level
is routinely forced upon courts faced with the problem of discovering a
limitation period for private suits under section 303 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act. 5 The cost in terms of the courts' time and ex-
pense to the litigants is considerable, and the end result is that the statute
of limitations applicable to this federal remedy varies throughout the fifty
'states.
Federal courts have been urged to adopt a uniform time limitation for
actions under this legislation such as the four-year period permitted in
Clayton Act suits." None has actually done so, however, and it is doubt-
ful that any court will seriously consider such an alternative since the
Supreme Court has spoken unfavorably of the matter. In UA W v. Hoos-
ier Cardinal Corp.,4 7 an action for damages under section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act,4" the Court was urged to devise a
uniform time limitation to close the statutory gap left by Congress." But
the Court refused to permit what it termed "so bald a form of judicial
innovation,"50 and held that state statutes of limitation controlled.51 Thus,
3Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.320 (1971). This section provides:
When a cause of action has arisen in another state or country, and by the
laws of the state or country where the cause of action accrued the time for
commencement of an action therein is limited to a shorter period of time
than the period of limitations prescribed by the laws of this state for a like
cause of action, then said action shall be barred in this state at the expira-
tion of said shorter period.
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-2-12(a) (1971). The applicable statute was amended June
II, 1959. UMW contended that the pre-1959 statute's one year limitation period regarding
personal actions which do not "survive" should be applied. Plaintiff argued and the court
so held that a section 303 cause of action did survive the injured party, and thus the two-
year limitation period for such actions in both the pre-1959 and post-1959 versions of the
statute applied.
15See, e.g., UMW v. Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F.2d 52, 61 (6th Cir. 1959).
6See International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 198 F.
Supp. 911, 915 (S.D. Cal. 1961), rev'd, 350 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1965). See also UAW v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 713 (1966); (White, J. dissenting).
47383 U.S. 696 (1966).
4829 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
11383 U.S. at 701.
501d.
51Id. at 703-04. The Court commented:
As early as 1830, this Court held that state statutes of limitation govern
the timeliness of federal causes of action unless Congress has specifically
provided otherwise. . . .Since that time, state statutes have repeatedly
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despite the loss of time, the expense and the unfairness created by the lack
of a limitation period in section 303 actions, it is not probable that any
court will look to parallel legislation, such as the Clayton Act, to provide
a uniform statute of limitations.
The next issue, and certainly the major problem in Railing, involved
the determination of when a cause of action under section 303 accrues.5 2
This determination is of pivotal importance since it governs the time a
suit might be brought and also starts the running of the limitation period.
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit observed that
there would appear to be no common sense reason why Congress would
intend that injuries to business or property be treated differently with
respect to timeliness simply because one of the litigants may be a labor
union.5 3 As a result, Railing explicitly held that the rationale of Zenith4
regarding the accrual of a cause of action under the Clayton Act applies
fully to similar suits for injury to business or property brought in the form
of a section 303 action.55
In restating the holding of the Supreme Court in Zenith, the court of
appeals found that a cause of action accrues, for the purpose of determin-
ing when a suit may be brought and thus for the purpose of determining
supplied the periods of limitations for federal causes of action when federal
legislation has been silent on the question. . . . Yet when Congress has
disagreed with such an interpretation of its silence, it has spoken to over-
turn it by enacting a uniform period of limitation. E.g., 69 Stat. 283, 15
U.S.C. § 15(b) (1964 ed.) (Clayton Act). . . . Against this background,
we cannot take the omission in the present statute as a license to judicially
devise a uniform time limitation for § 301 suits.
Id.
52Although a federal statute may fail to indicate when a cause of action accrues, the
issue as to when there is a complete and present cause of action so that suit might be brought
is nevertheless a federal question to be resolved by the application of federal as opposed to
state law. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96, 98 (1941).
1445 F.2d at 354. The court argued:
There are, of course, differences between the Labor Management Relations
Act and the Clayton Act. It may well be theoretically possible to distin-
guish the statutes so as to render the Zenith interpretation of the Clayton
Act inapplicable to a Section 303 cause of action. But a cause of action
for injury to business or property is pretty much the same in nature
whether derived from a statute governing labor-management relations or
free enterprise between competing business entities. We think the order of
remand is not an invitation to conclude that the rationale of Zenith is
inapplicable to a Section 303 cause of action, and that instead the Court
has intimated the contrary.
Id.
54401 U.S. 321 (1971).
55445 F.2d at 354.56/d .
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when the statute of limitations begins to run, at the time that damage
occurs. Zenith had rejected those cases which assume that a civil conspir-
acy involves a single, indivisible cause of actionY Under this now dis-
carded theory, some single point in time had to be seized as marking the
beginning of the limitation period," with the result that if that time was
earlier than the statutory period prior to commencement of the suit the
action was timely,"9 although the unlawful conduct began prior to the
limitations period.
The theory adopted by the Supreme Court in Zenith reflected the
policy"0 that some division of an extended antitrust claim must be made
'for purposes of applying the statute of limitations. Thus the Court rea-
soned that where successive damages are suffered day by day from a
continuing conspiracy the statute of limitations begins to run on each
day's damages as they occur." The recovery of future damages, however,
presented a slight variation to the problem.
The Court noted in Zenith that an injured party might not be able to
prove future damages with sufficient certainty to recover in an initial suit,
even though the acts which cause the damages had already occurred. In
this situation, it was determined that the cause of action would accrue and
thus the statute of limitations would begin to run only when such damages
became ascertainable.13 Otherwise, future damages which could not be
proved within the limitation period following the conduct from which
they flowed would be forever incapable of recovery. 4
7E.g., Manok v. Southeast Dist. Bowling Ass'n, 306 F. Supp. 1215 (C.D. Cal. 1969);
Winkler-Koch Eng'r Co. v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 100 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
-1lThe criterion determining the beginning of the limitation period was the time at which
the unlawful activity terminated, or when the purpose of the unlawful activity was achieved.
Winkler-Koch Eng'r Co. v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 100 F. Supp. 15,29 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
5uThe single cause of action theory was the position taken by plaintiffs and adopted by
the Fourth Circuit prior to remand from the Supreme Court. 429 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1970).
1The Supreme Court's opinion was based upon earlier statements of the "multiple
cause of action" theory articulated in Crummer Co. v. duPont, 223 F.2d 238 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 848 (1955); Delta Theaters, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 158 F.
Supp. 644 (E.D. La. 1958).
"See note 71 infra regarding the underlying purpose of statutes of limitation.
'2Bluefields S.S. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 243 F. I (3d Cir. 1917), appeal dismissed,
248 U.S. 595 (1918), contains the earliest statement of the rule:
The statute began to run when the cause of action arose, and the cause of
action arose when the damage occurred. Then action might have been
brought.
Id. at 20.
61401 U.S. at 339. The Supreme Court argued that not to permit these damages would
be contrary to the congressional purpose that private actions serve as a bulwark of antitrust
enforcement. Id. at 340.
"401 U.S. at 340.
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The Fourth Circuit accepted the Zenith holding that speculative dam-
ages may be recoverable at a later time, and related the theory of recovery
of present and provable damages to that of future damages by stating that
[a] single wrong may produce immediately ascertainable damages
and also have a future speculative impact and potential injury. In
such a situation the cause of action accrues and the period of
limitations begins to run at different points in time, but in both
instances at the time the damages are ascertainable."5
Consequently, a single act which causes injury may give rise to several
causes of action by the same plaintiff, each accruing at different times
depending upon when damages become provable.
Plaintiffs in Railing sought three kinds of compensatory damages: one
million dollars for loss of profits and damage to their business; one
hundred thousand dollars for damage to property, machinery and equip-
ment; and twenty thousand dollars for sums expended to resume business
operations." Since the Railings initially filed complaint in this action on
June 28, 1961, the earliest date of applicability of the statute of limita-
tions would be June 28, 1959.67 Applying Zenith to plaintiffs' allegations,
the court of appeals indicated the following pattern of possible recovery:
I. Recovery of the costs of resuming business would not be
barred by the statute of limitations because there would be no way
of determining these costs with reasonable precision until after the
unlawful activity ceased and resumption of business had
begun ...
II. Recovery for specific property, machinery and equipment,
damaged before June 28, 1959, would be barred. Recovery for
such property damaged after June 28, 1959, would not be barred.
III. Lost profits which are reasonably attributed to the loss of
daily sales before June 28, 1959, would be barred.
IV. Lost profits reasonably attributable to the loss of daily sales
after June 28, 1959, would not be barred.
V. Lost profits or operating losses which can reasonably be
attributed to the total effect of the illegal activity during the entire
strike period because of the overall effect on plaintiffs business
reputation and capacity to produce and perform contracts, and
other similar losses which may be determined by the District Court
1445 F.2d at 354.
"Id. at 355.
6The statute of limitations under the West Virginia Code is two years. W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-2-12(a) (1971). Under rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an action
is deemed commenced upon the filing of the complaint with the court. FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
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to have been unascertainable on June 28, 1959, would not be
barred. Stated differently, and more accurately, the statute of
limitations would not begin to run with respect to such damages
until such time as the District Court may determine that they were
reasonably ascertainable."8
Viewed in this light, it appears that the court of appeals has increased
the protection offered the private plaintiff. Now suit may be brought
when damages become ascertainable and without regard to when the acts
of the defendant actually occurred. For example, the court suggests that
lost profits attributable to the overall effect on plaintiff's business reputa-
tion caused by defendant's illegal strike activities may be recovered al-
though many years intervene between cessation of the strike and bringing
of suit.69 The sole requirement is that action be brought within the statu-
tory period following the time that such damages become reasonably
ascertainable."
It may be argued, however, that the policy behind the statute of
limitations would be destroyed since, by the time damages become ascer-
tainable and suit can be brought, evidence will be stale and witnesses may
no longer be available." As a result, the union might never be free from
suit arising out of its conduct as long as there remains any possibility that
plaintiff at some later point would be injured by that conduct.
Perhaps the wisest course would be to require the plaintiff to prove
the fact of the violation within the statutory period following defendant's
illegal conduct in every case. Any recovery in the first suit would not bar
a later action for damages which could only be determined at a later time.
When those damages, too speculative to permit recovery in the first
action, become ascertainable the plaintiff could then bring a second suit.
In this manner, the interests of the defendant will be protected since he
will not have to defend his conduct under the Labor Management Rela-
es445 F.2d at 355.
6 rext accompanying note 68 supra.
70Text accompanying note 65 supra.
7'Justice Goldberg, speaking for the Court in Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380
U.S. 424 (1965), commenting on the purpose of statutes of limitation, indicated that
[s]tatutes of limitations are primarily designed to assure fairness to defen-
dants. Such statutes "promote justice by preventing surprises through he
revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is-
that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on
notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be
free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute
them." Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
321 U.S. 342, 348-49 [(1944)].
Id. at 428.
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tions Act after the statutory period.12 In addition, the plaintiff's interest
will be protected in that he will not be denied recovery for future damages
caused by defendant's conduct.
On remand to the district court, the Fourth Circuit suggested a third
area in which the Clayton Act analogy might assist courts in defining
rights under section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The
court noted that section 5(b) of the Clayton Act73 permitted the suspen-
sion of the statute of limitations during the pendency of an action brought
by the United States Government for the same violation. Thus, the court
of appeals requested the lower court to consider whether there may be
appropriately fashioned an analogous tolling rule that would apply to the
period of time during which an administrative proceeding involving the
same unlawful activities is pending before the NLRB.
74
Since provisions of the Clayton Act are enforceable not only by pri-
vate parties under section 4 but also by a number of federal
administrative bodies, 75 the similarities between government enforcement
under the Clayton Act and the Labor Management Relations Act invite
comparison. The Federal Trade Commission, for example, was estab-
lished to protect business and the public against unfair methods of compe-
tition and to prevent practices which would lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly. 7 The Commission has broad investigatory powers,
7
and should it find evidence of an unlawful practice it may order the
offending party to "cease and desist."78 The Supreme Court has ruled that
7rrhe doctrine of collateral estoppel makes conclusive in subsequent proceedings be-
tween same parties determinations of fact, and mixed law and fact, that were essential to
the decision. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 601-02 (1948).
"Clayton Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1970).
7455 F.2d at 355. The court observed that the purpose of statutes of repose is to prevent
suits after the evidence is stale, and suggested that depending upon the identity of issues
before the Board it is possible that such a proceeding, like a government suit under the
Clayton Act, may keep the litigants on guard to preserve and perpetuate evidence and have
it available for subsequent litigation that might develop.
"'Section I I of the Clayton Act authorizes the Interstate Commerce Commission to
enforce Clayton Act provisions where applicable to common carriers subject to the Interstate
Commerce Act; the Federal Communications Commission has similar authorization where
applicable to common carriers engaged in wire or radio communication or radio transmis-
sion: the Civil Aeronautics Board where applicable to air carriers; the Federal Reserve Board
where applicable to banks, banking associations, and trust companies; and the Federal Trade
Commission where applicable to all other character of commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 21(a)
(1970).
7616 C.F.R. § l.l (1970). Under section 15 of the Clayton Act, the Department of
Justice may also enforce antitrust provisions in the federal district courts. 15 U.S.C. § 25
(1970).
"Federal Trade Commission Act § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 46(a) (1970).
18Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
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a proceeding brought by the Federal Trade Commission suspends the
running of the statute of limitations to the same extent and in the same
circumstances as does an action brought by the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice in a federal district court.79 In a more recent
decision, the Supreme Court has indicated that despite differences be-
tween a governmental action and a later private suit, as long as the
complaint is based in part on matters of which the government com-
plained, the statute of limitations is tolled. 0
In provisions similar to those of the Clayton Act, the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act provides that unfair labor practices may be the object
of a private suit under section 303, and also of governmental action by
the NLRB.8' Section 10(1)2 authorizes the Board to investigate charges
of unfair labor practices, and if the Board officer or regional attorney
finds reasonable cause to believe the charge is true, he may petition the
federal district court for injunctive relief pending final adjudication by the
Board.8 Subsequently, if it determines that an unfair labor practice has
been committed, the Board has the remedial power to order the union to
"cease and desist" from the unlawful activity.8Y
In addition, the NLRB shares a number of policy and procedural
objectives with the FTC. The purpose of the FTC is to investigate and
condemn unfair methods of competition as defined by the antitrust laws;"
one of the principal purposes of the NLRB is to investigate unfair labor
practices as defined in the National Labor Relations Act.8 Any person
can request the FTC to institute an investigation in respect to any matter
within its jurisdiction; 7 similarly, an unfair labor practice charge can be
filed with the NLRB by anyone.88 Despite the fact that private persons
bring the charge, however, the FTC and the NLRB are considered parties
to actions which they investigate, and it is these boards that must seek
79Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311
(1965).
9Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54 (1965). The Court observed that the
tolling of the statute of limitatons may not be made to turn on whether the government is
successful, but that matters complained of in the government action must bear a "real
relation" to the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 59.
"1National Labor Relations Act § 10(a), (k), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a), (k) (1970). In order
to bring a suit for damages under section 303, there is no requirement that plaintiff obtain
prior determination of unfair labor practices by the NLRB. See International Longshore-
men v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 244 (1952).
$129 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970).
83d.
-29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
-l6C.F.R. § 1.1 (1970).
M29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1970).
"I6C.F.R. § 2.2(a)(1971).
-29C.F.R. § 102.9 (1971).
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court enforcement of their cease and desist orders. 9 Moreover, as an aid
to the private litigant, formal documents constituting the record in a
proceeding before either the FTC or the NLRB are available to anyone
for inspection and copying.9
Lastly, the result of a finding of a violation of the laws by the FTC
or the NLRB may have similar effect upon the outcome of subsequent
private litigation. Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act"' provides that a finding
of a violation of the antitrust laws in a proceeding brought by the United
States shall be prima facie evidence against a defendant in a private
action.92 Although there is no similar statute pertaining to NLRB actions,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a finding of a union
violation of 8(b)(4)93 is res judicata of the union's liability in a suit
brought under section 303.11 Thus, in many respects, it would appear that
Congress's announced policy that private actions should serve as a deter-
rent to unfair labor practices95 would be furthered by permitting the
tolling of the statute of limitations during the pendency of governmental
actions before the NLRB. Certainly it would alleviate much of the harsh-
ness to prospective plaintiffs in those states which have limitation periods
of two years or less.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has given some indication of
a countervailing policy which might outweigh advantages inherent in
tolling the statute of limitations. In UA W v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp."
the Court ruled that the limitation period in a private suit under section
3017 was not tolled by prior state court litigation involving the same
"9See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970); 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).
"0See 16 C.F.R. § 4.8 (1971) (regarding FTC provisions); 29 C.F.R. § 102.117(b)(1)
(1971) (regarding NLRB provisions).
1115 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1970).
"2The First Circuit has held that a final order of the Federal Trade Commission in an
antitrust case may be admitted as prima facie evidence against defendants in a subsequent
treble-damage suit pursuant to section 5(a) of the Clayton Act. Farmington Dowel Prod.
Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 75 (1st Cir. 1970). The court approved the theory
that this provision only establishes a rebuttable presumption and, therefore, takes no ques-
tion of fact from either court or jury. Id.
'29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970).
'4H.L. Robertson & Assoc., Inc. v. Plumbers Local 519, 429 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1970);
Painters' Dist. Council v. Edgewood Contracting Co., 416 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1969). But
see Old Dutch Farms, Inc. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 584, 359 F.2d 598
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 832 (1966).
95Note 38 supra.
96383 U.S. 696 (1965).
'7Labor Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). Section 301 au-
thorizes private suits to recover damages caused by breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment.
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parties and issues.9 8 Indeed, the Court specifically pointed out that the six
months provision regarding unfair labor practice proceedings by the
NLRB9 suggested that relatively rapid disposition of labor disputes is a
goal of federal labor law."'0 It was also noted that section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act establishes no policy of uniformity expressed
in the form of a national limitations provision. 1 ' The implication was
clear that only when Congress expresses a uniform time limitation upon
the bringing of suit based on a federal right should courts consider fash-
ioning a tolling rule. Thus it is doubtful that courts will graft a tolling
provision on section 303 actions as long as Congress refuses to establish
a uniform statute of limitations.
It is apparent that when Congress drafts a law in response to strong
public demand, it does not always pay attention to the small details which
remain to plague courts for years thereafter. As indicated in the case of
the Labor Management Relations Act, statutory gaps in the law have
resulted in considerable loss of time and expense. Thus, after four court
decisions and more than ten years of litigation, Railing v. United Mine
Workers of America finally proceeds to a hearing on the merits.
The problems which have delayed Railing were based upon the lack
of a statute of limitations and any reference for determining when a cause
of action accrues. As Railing indicates, courts have refused to judicially
create a uniform statute of limitations, referring instead to state limita-
tion periods which vary considerably. By drawing an analogy to parallel
remedies in the Clayton Act, the Fourth Circuit adopted the antitrust
rule that a cause of action accrues ony when damages become ascertaina-
ble, thus extending the plaintiff's scope of recovery. What remains to be
decided is whether courts should fashion a tolling rule such as that permit-
ted by the Clayton Act. The Supreme Court's reluctance, however, to
consider this alternative in a similar suit makes this prospect doubtful.
Thus, while the creation of a tolling provision would appear to be consis-
tent with policy underlying section 303 actions, the initiative in this direc-
tion most probably must come from Congress.
MORRIS E. FLATER
11383 U.S. at 707.
" National Labor Relations Act § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970). This section pro-
vides in part:
[N]o complaint shall issue [from the Natonal Labor Relations Board]
based upon any unfair labor practice [as defined in section 8(b)(4)] occur-
ing more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the
Board. . ..
Id.
IG°383 U.S. at 707.
"'Id. at 708.
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